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  Abstract 
We use a regime switching approach to model the implementation of the SNB monetary policy. 
The regime switching technique is crucial to assess the flexibility inherent in the SNB's monetary 
policy concept. The empirical findings support the idea that repo operations are instrumental in 
smoothing the implementation of monetary policy in normal times while changes in the official 
operational target accompanied by the accommodating use of repo operations produce the aimed 
effects in distressed periods. A significant contribution also came from some new measures 
designed to improve liquidity in the Swiss franc money market during the financial crisis in 2007-
8. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Central banks rely on diﬀerent mechanisms to implement their monetary policy.
The recent market turmoil highlighted how varying tools can entail completely
diﬀerent outcomes, in particular in terms of short term interest rate patterns.
During the recent ﬁnancial market crisis, the ability of the Swiss National Bank
(SNB) in stabilising its target rate was observed with much interest by many
specialists. For instance, by means of its Survey magazine1, the International
Monetary Fund pointed out that "(T)he Swiss (monetary) approach imparts a
degree of ﬂexibility, which has served it well during the turbulence in ﬁnancial
markets." Probably the most noticeable characteristic of the SNB’s monetary
concept is the sense of balance between its long term objective of price stability
and its implementation mechanism that is distinguished by a pragmatic short
term ﬂexibility. The intellectual background of this combination is discussed in
Baltensperger, Hildebrand and Jordan (2007). The former property, i.e. a ﬁrm
long term anchor for nominal stability, has assured stable prices, which is an
important prerequisite for the smooth functioning of the economy. The latter
quality, i.e. short term ﬂexibility in policy implementation, has two aspects.
First, it assures the regular functioning of liquidity provision in normal times
and a swift response to exogenous shocks to the ﬁnancial market. Second, it is
an eﬀective tool to achieve the intended policy stance in turbulent times.
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we propose an econometric
representation that captures the main characteristics of the SNB implementa-
tion mechanism. An antecedent in the literature is Jordan and Kugler (2004).
Our model diﬀers from it in several respects. On the one hand, it takes account
of the oﬃcial operational target, which is a range for the three-month Swiss
franc Libor. On the other hand, it incorporates the crucial role of SNB repo
transactions, which provide the banking system with liquidity. A distinguishing
characteristic of this dual mechanism in the monetary policy implementation is
its adaptability in stress periods. We capture this feature in a regime switch-
ing model, where the regime mechanism depends on the tightness of money
market conditions. Conceptually, the state dependency of the model ties with
the ﬂexibility of the SNB’s monetary policy concept. Second, we analyse how
the market reacted to monetary policy decisions and to new funding facilities
introduced by the SNB to confront the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007—8. In particular,
we investigate whether the announcement and provision of US dollar funding to
the Swiss money market, Swiss franc liquidity to the Eurosystem as well as un-
1See Ross (2008).
3scheduled decisions about the SNB target range were associated with signiﬁcant
eﬀects on the 3M-Libor.
The structure of the remaining part of the paper is as follows: In Section 2
we review the main characteristics of the SNB monetary concept and its repo
operations, and in Section 3 we explain the empirical set up. Section 4 contains
the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The monetary policy concept and its repo op-
erations
In this section, we shortly review the main characteristics of the SNB’s monetary
policy concept and the Swiss franc repo market. More comprehensive contri-
butions on the concept can be found in Jordan and Peytrignet (2001, 2007)
and Meyer (2000). Veyrassat (2001, 2004) and Kraenzlin (2007) provide more
detailed descriptions about the repo operations. We also shortly survey the new
measures taken by the SNB to steer the money market during the ﬁnancial crisis
in 2007-8. A more exhaustive presentation can be found in a box of the SNB’s
Monetary Policy Report of the fourth Quarter in 2008 (SNB, 2008).
2.1 The monetary policy concept
At the end of 1999, the SNB abandoned the monetary targeting approach. The
new monetary policy framework is characterised by three main elements: (1) an
explicit deﬁnition of price stability; (2) a conditional inﬂation forecast as main
indicator for future policy decisions; (3) a range for the 3M-Libor as operational
target. The overriding objective of price stability is considered to be achieved
with an inﬂation rate, measured by the national consumer price index, of less
than 2% per annum. An inﬂation forecast for the next 12 quarters which takes
into account all relevant information is the main indicator for policy decisions.
The ﬁrst two elements are complemented by the announcement of a target
range for the three-month Swiss franc Libor. As documented in SNB (1999),
the main reasons for choosing an oﬀ-shore market rate are the following: the
Libor is the common money market rate, it is sensitive to all shocks relevant for
monetary policy, and, by its very nature, it diﬀers from repo rates, i.e. unlike a
repo operation the Libor represents the indicative rate of "unsecured" interbank
loans, which can give rise to liquidity and credit premia.
To understand the relevance of the last point, it is worth emphasizing the
diﬀerent implications of targeting "secure" and "unsecure" interest rates. The
4Libor represents the short term interest rate at which banks lend money to each
other without posting collateral. Hence, it is an unsecure interest rate since
the lender bears credit and liquidity risks. The related risk premia can increase
substantially during ﬁnancial crisis, as has been observable since the outbreak
of the ﬁnancial crisis in August 2007. By contrast, repos are loans backed by
securities. Thus, the repo rate is virtually free of risk. By targeting a range for
the Libor, the SNB automatically takes into account the actual borrowing cost
on the money market that includes risk premia and that ultimately determines
the cost of borrowing in a broader sense (i.e. mortgages, corporate debts or
derivative pricing).
2.2 Repo market
A repo transaction is a loan secured by collateral. The cash taker sells securities
to the cash provider and repurchases them after an agreed period. The cash
taker pays the cash provider a repo rate depending on the maturity of the
transaction. The Swiss franc repo market can be divided in two main parts,
namely the SNB repo market, characterised by transactions between the SNB
and banks, and the repo interbanking market.
The SNB provides the banks with liquidity via repo transactions on a daily
basis. Repos are auctioned in the morning in a ﬁxed tender (as a rule) or are
concluded in the course of the day on a bilateral basis. The liquidity provided
is credited to non-interest-bearing sight deposits which the banks keep with the
SNB. In normal times, the demand for sight deposits is determined by payment
transactions, by the need for precautionary balance, and by the minimum re-
serve requirements stipulated in the National Bank Act.2 A c c o r d i n gt ot h e s e
provisions, the banks must cover certain short term liabilities with coins and
banknotes denominated in Swiss francs as well as sight deposits held with the
SNB. The liquidity provided by the SNB is then traded on the interbank market.
Interest rates on the money market are thus inﬂuenced by the price and volume
of the liquidity injected by the SNB. In other words, the SNB indirectly steers
the Libor by ﬁxing rates and the amount to be allotted in the repo transactions.
2.3 New measures during the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007-8
The SNB, as other central banks, has faced the crisis with three main measures:
unscheduled monetary decisions, repo transactions in US dollar and a swap
2Foreign banks are not required to fulﬁl the minimum reserve requirements rule. The main
reason for participation of foreign banks in repo auctions of the SNB is to reﬁnance loans
denominated in Swiss francs.
5arrangement through which the ECB can access Swiss franc liquidity to provide
the Swiss franc funding allotted to banks in its jurisdiction.
2.3.1 Monetary policy assessments
After a tightening stance from June 2004 to September 2007, lifting the mid-
point of the target range for the 3M-Libor from 0.25% to 2.75%, the SNB kept
the target range unchanged at 2.25%—3.25% from mid-September 2007 to mid-
September 2008. Facing a rapid deterioration in global economic outlook and
drop in inﬂation, the SNB went through an unprecedented relaxation of the
monetary policy with four consecutive cuts of the target range in a very short
period from 8 October to 11 December 2008. The monetary policy assessments
on 6 October , 11 November and 20 November 2008 were unscheduled. On these
occasions the the midpoint of the target range by 1.75 percentage points. At
the scheduled assessment mid-December the SNB cut its target range by further
50 basis points down to 0.50%.
2.3.2 US dollar funding
This new facility was designed to facilitate the US dollar funding of SNB coun-
terparties in the Swiss repo system. On 12 December 2007, the SNB announced
the ﬁrst provision of this funding. It was jointly introduced with the Bank of
Canada, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Fed-
eral Reserve (Fed). The ﬁrst operation took place on 17 December 2007 when
the SNB oﬀered US dollar repo transactions for the maximum amount of USD
4 billion in addition to its Swiss franc open market operations. The dollar repo
transaction against SNB-eligible collateral was conducted in the form of a vari-
able rate tender auction and it provided funds for 28 days, with settlement on 20
December 2007. To back these operations, the SNB concluded a reciprocal swap
agreement (swap line) with the Fed. A second operation was announced on 10
January 2008 and was implemented on 14 January. In a joint statement with
the G10 central banks, the SNB announced on 11 March 2008 the intention to
continue as long as necessary with US dollar repo auctions. The characteristics
of this facility changed during the year. In particular it was increased in terms
of frequency, maturities and maximum amount oﬀered.
2.3.3 Swiss franc funding
Foreign banks in the euro area with no direct access to SNB operations exerted
an upward pressure on short term Swiss Franc money market rates. On 15 Oc-
6tober 2008, the SNB and the ECB (Eurosystem) jointly announced the intention
to conduct EUR/CHF foreign exchange swaps with the aim to provide Swiss
francs against euro with a term of 7 days at a ﬁxed price. The operations took
place each Monday starting on 20 October 2008. To back these operations, the
SNB and the ECB entered into a temporary swap arrangement through which
the ECB can access Swiss franc liquidity to provide Swiss franc liquidity to
banks in its jurisdiction.
On 7 November 2008, the SNB and the Polish central bank (NBP) an-
nounced to cooperate to provide Swiss franc liquidity by establishing a tempo-
rary EUR/CHF swap arrangement. On 28 January 2009, a similar initiative
was announced together with the Hungarian central bank (MNB). This new
facility is similar to the existing one with the SNB and the ECB. The rationale
w a st oa l l o wt h eN B Pa n dt h eM N Bt oo ﬀer Swiss franc funding to banks in
their jurisdictions in the form of foreign exchange swaps.
3 Empirical Setup
3.1 Economic explanation
The implementation of the SNB’s monetary policy concept relies on two main
elements: a decision about which part of the target range (upper half, centre or
lower half) it is aiming, and about the volume of repo transactions. According to
the expectations hypothesis, monetary policy surprises should have an impact on
asset prices rather than actual changes in the central banks’ target rate. Thus,
following Kuttner (2004), we compute a measure of surprise target rate changes
by using the nearest-to-maturity futures contracts on the Swiss franc three-
month Libor. In order to enhance the measurement precision and to minimise
endogeneity problems, we measure the price change over 30 minutes, i.e. 10
minutes before and 20 minutes after the exact release time of a monetary policy
decision.3 We call this variable surprt. The repo operations are represented by
the one-week repo rate on day t, repot (its diﬀerence is denoted ∆repot)a n dt h e
allotted volume in the morning auctions. We compute the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the
allotment ratio (i.e. allotted divided by bid volume) and call it ∆allotratiot.4
The intraday data set necessary to compute the monetary policy surprise and
3For further information about the timing and surprise eﬀect of SNB monetary policy
assessments, cf. Ranaldo and Rossi (2007).
4In the morning auction, the SNB adds up all bids and decides the proportion to be
allotted. Normally, it allots on a pro rata basis, i.e. after a minimal allotment to each bank,
the remaining demand is accommodated in percentage of the amount bid.
7the data on the repo operations are from the SNB.5
The Libor evolves according to credit conditions in the money market. How-
ever, the ﬂexibility of the SNB concept enables it to react to unexpected events.
To take account of these features, our empirical model allows the Libor to behave
according to regimes characterised by normal and distressed markets. Empiri-
cally, the regime depends on the tightness of money market conditions, which is
proxied by the standardised (to have zero mean and unit variance) spread be-
tween the Libor and repo rates, denoted zt. This spread can be seen as a broad
measure of risk premia on interbank lending. In troubled times, this spread
typically widens.
Other factors can determine the evolution of the Libor. It can follow an
autoregressive pattern. Also, there can be some exogenous variables that cor-
respond to those market factors that the SNB may take into account to ﬁx
its morning repo rates but that are outside its control. Below, we limit the
empirical analysis to the VIX index, i.e. vixt.6
The remaining variables capture the new funding facilities introduced by the
SNB in the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis. We use information publicly available
to set up a dataset containing the announcement and implementation days of
the US dollar and Swiss franc funding auctions. We keep these two facilities
and their announcements as well as their execution times separate in order to
distinguish their eﬀects. The dummy variable, called swapt,e q u a l s1w h e na
CHF funding auction takes place and 0 otherwise.
3.2 Econometric model
Our regime switching technique models the coeﬃcients as changing smoothly
with the regime that we generally call z. In practice, this means that the
coeﬃcient of a regressor is
b(z)=[ 1− G(z)]b1 + G(z)b2 (1)
where G(z) is a logistic function G(z)=1 /[1 + exp(−3(z − c))].W h e nz (the
standardised Libor—Repo spread) is low, then the eﬀective slope is b1,w h e n
z = c, then the slope is (b1+b2)/2,a n dw i t hav e r yh i g hz the slope is eﬀectively
b2. This function is illustrated in Figure 2 (using the value of c estimated below).
5We are grateful to Marcel Zimmermann for providing us the dataset.
6All other variables we considered, such as the overnight volatility on the exchange rate
market, were insigniﬁcant.
8The formation process of the Libor can be structured as follows:
∆libort = φ∆libort−1 + δ(zt−1)surprt + χ(zt−1)∆repot
+ ϕ∆allotratiot + ψswapt + λvixt−1 + α + εt (2)
This equation means that changes in the Libor can be due to ﬁve main
drivers. First, it can be aﬀected by unexpected changes in the oﬃcial target
range, i.e. surprt. We carefully considered the timing of the news releases.
When the SNB announces its decision on the target range for the Libor before
(after) the Libor rate ﬁxing, i.e. at noon CET, the decision is supposed to
impact on the Libor rate on the same day (day after). Second, the Libor might
respond to changes in repo rates, i.e. ∆repot. Since the SNB morning auction
i ss e ta t9 : 1 0C E T ,w ec o n s i d e rt h ee ﬀects of the repo operations on the same
day of the Libor ﬁxing. The coeﬃcients on these two variables are allowed to
change with the regime variable (the standardised Libor—Repo spread, lagged
one day) as illustrated in equation (1).
Third, a broader provision of liquidity should decrease the Libor. We at-
tempt to capture this eﬀect by looking at the change in volume allotted at the
morning repo auctions, i.e. ∆allotratiot. Fourth, we analyse whether the new
funding facilities had some bearing on the Libor rates. In the equation above,
we take the representative case of the implementation of the Swiss franc funding
provided by the Eurosystem, i.e. swapt. However, we also inspected the imple-
mentation and announcement eﬀects of the US dollar funding. Fifth and ﬁnally,
the VIX index, i.e. vixt−1, is a proxy for exogenous variables. These three last
variables in equation (2) are not allowed to change with the regime–as pre-
liminary regressions indicated that the coeﬃcients related to ∆allotratiot and
vixt−1 do not change signiﬁcantly across regimes and that Swiss franc funding
auctions took place only in the high regime (e.g. swapt).
We estimate the parameters by GMM (actually, nonlinear least squares) and
the t-stats account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelations. In total, there
are 10 parameters (c in (1), and φ,δ1,δ 2,χ 1,χ 2,ϕ,ψ,λ,αin (2)).
3.3 Limitations
It is worth emphasizing some limitations of the model presented above.7 In par-
ticular, the repo conditions have changed over time. In mid-August 2007 (i.e.
at the beginning of the credit crunch) the SNB expanded its list of collateral
7In 2007, there was some criticism in the press about the representativeness of the Libor.
We believe this criticism is inapplicable to this study (e.g. we consider changes in Libor in a
high-frequency domain).
9eligible in the repo transactions.8 On 16 October 2008, the SNB introduced a
special purpose vehicle (SPV) as a long term ﬁnancing to sustain the Swiss ﬁnan-
cial sector. Speciﬁcally, SNB created a SPV to perform an orderly liquidation
of illiquid securities and other troubled assets held by the UBS. We controlled
whether there was a particular response of the Libor on the announcement day
of the SPV. This simple, ad hoc event study analysis rejected this hypothesis.
A ﬁnal possible shortcoming of our study comes from the inception of the SNB
Bills, an instrument to absorb liquidity, on 15 October 2008. Again, a simple
event study analysis shows no particular eﬀect on the announcement day.
We considered several alternative speciﬁcations of the model. In particular,
we analysed a bivariate VAR model in a regime switching setting where the
ﬁrst equation features the Libor dynamics and the second equation the repo
rates. We also analysed treating the regime mechanism as dependent on the
spread between the Libor and the Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates rather than
between the Libor and repo rates. These alternative models deliver the same
picture as the results presented below. We also considered an error correction
mechanism between the Libor and repo rates, the actual changes of the midpoint
target range in addition to the monetary surprise as well as one or more lags for
the regressors and auto-regressive terms. They turned out to be insigniﬁcant. It
is also worth noting that our results are not sensitive to the speciﬁc parameter
3 in the logistic function. We obtain similar results when it is replaced with any
ﬁgure from one up to large positive numbers.
4 Empirical Findings
The empirical analysis is based on daily data from January 2000 to the end of
2008. Figure 1 shows the behaviour of the regime variable z (the standardised
Libor—repo spread) across time. The high regime arises especially at the end of
the sample period after Lehman Brothers ﬁled for bankruptcy. Figure 2 depicts
the pattern of the regime function. It shows that the high regime kicks in when
the standardised Libor—repo spread is above the estimated value at 1.3.
Table 1 exhibits the main results. The upper part of the table shows the
estimated coeﬃcients and the related t-statistics that remain unchanged across
regimes. The regime dependence of these regressors were insigniﬁcant in pre-
liminary regressions (not shown) or some of them were implemented only in the
high regime (e.g. swapt). The middle of the table reports the estimate for the
8On 11 December 2008 and the day after, the SNB oﬀered one-year Repo contracts at the
same rate of the one-week repo. There was little demand for longer repo maturities.
10standardised value of c of the logistic function. At the bottom left-hand (right-
hand) side of the table we report the estimated coeﬃcients and t-statistics in
normal (distressed) times, which we refer to as the "low regime" ("high regime").
Similarly, Table 2 shows the changes in the estimated coeﬃcients between the
two regimes. Low-regime (high-regime) days occurred 2084 (263) times.
Two main results emerge from our analysis. First, the Libor reacts very
diﬀerently to repo and target range changes in the two regimes. In normal
times (low regime), the repo rate appears to be the main driver. The Libor-
repo rate link has the largest eﬀect, i.e. a change of 25 basis points in the
one-week repo rate translates, on average, into a change in the Libor of 5 basis
points. This ﬁnding suggests that market participants scrutinize the SNB repo
operations to understand its monetary policy stance which, in turn, aﬀords a
smooth implementation of monetary policy. On the other hand, during a crisis,
an unexpected change in the target range is extremely eﬀective in determining
the Libor. An unanticipated lowering of the target range by 25 basis points
implies, on average, a decrease in the Libor by 30 basis points.9
Second, three variables play a signiﬁcant role, regardless of the regime. We
ﬁnd that the new Swiss franc funding facility in the Eurosystem had a signiﬁcant
eﬀect in reducing the Libor. By contrast and not surprisingly, a no signiﬁcant
eﬀect from US dollar funding is discernible. Moreover, favourable eﬀects also
came from the repo operations of the morning auctions, which play an auxiliary
role in implementing a monetary policy decision. Accordingly, a larger allotment
of liquidity leads to a decrease in the Libor. Finally, a high value of the VIX
index is associated with a lower Libor. The main explanations for this link
are that (1) during the tightening phase from mid-2004 to mid-2007 the stock
market volatility was relatively low and (2) the Swiss franc tends to appreciate
when volatility is high10, which may require a counterbalancing interest rate
move in order to preserve the price stability in the medium term.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We use a regime switching approach to model the implementation of the SNB’s
monetary policy. A regime switching technique is crucial to assess the ﬂexibility
inherent in its monetary policy concept. The empirical ﬁndings support the
idea that the repo operations are instrumental in smoothing the monetary policy
9One could raise the question whether monetary policy surprises are more eﬀective in
turbulent times since there are more. Our speciﬁcation should be seen as free of this problem
since we control for the regime.
10See the safe haven eﬀects of the Swiss franc analysed by Ranaldo and Söderlind (2007)
11stance in normal times whereas (unexpected) decisions on the oﬃcial operational
target accompanied by a larger liquidity provision in the repo operations produce
the aimed eﬀects during distressed periods. Also, there is empirical evidence
that the new facility designed to ease funding problems in the Swiss franc money
market had the intended eﬀects.
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Logistic function coeff t-stats
c_logistic_mean 1.358 1.989
Low-Regime High-Regime
regime-dependent regressors coeff t-stats coeff t-stats
drepo 0.217 4.21 -0.064 -1.001
Surpr 0.411 3.200 1.283 14.185
R2 0.39
nObs 2347
15Table 2: Changes in the estimated coeﬃcients between the two regimes.
This table shows the changes in the estimated coeﬃcients and t-statistics between the "Low-
Regime" and "High-Regime" for the three regime-dependent regressors.
16change in coefficient t-stats
drepo -0.280 -3.285
Surpr 0.872 5.539
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